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Abstract
This paper introduces a descriptive model of the
human-computer processes that lead to decision-making
in visual analytics. A survey of nine models from the
visual analytics and HCI literature are presented to
account for different perspectives such as sense-making,
reasoning, and low-level human-computer interactions.
The survey examines the people and computers (entities)
presented in the models, the divisions of labour between
entities (both physical and role-based), the behaviour
of both people and machines as constrained by their
roles and agency, and finally the elements and processes
which define the flow of data both within and between
entities. The survey informs the identification of
four observations that characterise analytical behaviour
- defined as decision-making facilitated by visual
analytics: bilateral discourse, divisions of labour,
mixed-synchronicity information flows, and bounded
behaviour. Based on these principles, a descriptive
model is presented as a contribution towards a theory
of analytical behaviour. The future intention is to apply
prospect theory, a economic model of decision-making
under uncertainty, to the study of analytical behaviour.
It is our assertion that to apply prospect theory first
requires a descriptive model of the processes that
facilitate decision-making in visual analytics. We
conclude it necessary to measure the perception of risk
in future work in order to apply prospect theory to the
study of analytical behaviour using our proposed model.
1. Introduction
The fields of visual analytics and visualisation
cover a broad range of topics, providing insight into
computational and cognitive processes [1, 2, 3, 4].
The technologies and techniques associated with visual
analytics (VA) are used in a wide range of applications
within industries such as finance, marketing, business
intelligence, education, cyber-security, and healthcare.
Such tools address the challenges identified by
Cook and Thomas in their VA research agenda [1]
from 2005, to obtain insights that directly support
assessment, planning and decision-making. In the time
Since the agenda was published, new research has
extended the understanding of reasoning, sense-making,
task-analysis and also introduced behavioural economic
concepts of cognitive bias and framing effects to VA.
Decision-making is a broad topic that spans many
fields, but one which has been under-examined and
not formally defined in VA research. The real-world
application of visual analytics and visualisation
techniques to decision-making are commonplace. Stock
trading is perhaps the most obvious example; traders
interact with visualisations to inform their investment
choice resulting in an action to buy or sell - all of which
occurs within the same software. Economics researchers
have observed, modelled, and measured peoples’
decision-making for decades. Some experiments have
even examined the application of VA to economic
decision-making [2, 5, 6], finding VA provides effective
decision support through increased confidence, learning,
exploration and leads to better investment choices.
However, decision-making is not yet characterised in
VA as it has in economics by descriptive models such
as prospect theory. Furthermore, economic models do
not account for known representation effects that effect
decision-making [7]. Therefore, we identify a gap in
the study of decision-making facilitated by VA which
we define by the term analytical behaviour.
1.1. Decision-making
This paper approaches the study and characterisation
of decision-making in visual analytics from an
economics perspective. Research into cognitive and
perceptual processes have largely focused on perceptual
accuracy [8, 9, 10], guiding the design of tools towards
increasing their effectiveness and efficiency. However,
although some of the psychological and cognitive biases
that lead to the ’irrational’ behaviour identified by
economists [11] are known to VA researchers, there
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is no equivalent guidance on optimising VA tools for
decision-making.
Economics research has shown people to be
systematic and therefore predictably-irrational in their
decision-making processes using prospect theory[12].
However, prospect theory does not account for the visual
representation of data as a factor in the process - nor
to our knowledge does any other economic model of
behaviour. In 1979, when Kahneman and Tversky first
introduced Prospect Theory - a descriptive model of
choice under uncertainty - there were far fewer decisions
being informed by data visualisations compared to
today. The ubiquity of VA tools used in decision-making
is reason enough to account for them in a descriptive
view of the decision-making process.
A recent study within VA into representation effects
examined visualisation as a factor in decision-making
by reapplying the same general method and prospects
as Kahneman and Tversky. In the original prospect
theory experiment [12], participants were given different
classes of problems presented as written numbers of risk
and return values (i.e. choose between a 50% chance
of gaining $1000 or $500 with certainty). The more
recent VA experiment [7] presented similar risk/return
prospects in chart form and used different data, yet the
results align closely with the results from the original
prospect theory experiments; people are more likely to
be risk-averse in the domain of gains and risk-seeking
when it comes to losses. The study also provides
empirical evidence of a significant interaction between
the visual representation of data and the perception of
value in analytical behaviour.
In the context of modelling stock market trading,
once representation effects can be accounted for, the
application of prospect theory still depends on knowing
the user’s perceived valuation of risk and return.
We speculated that inputs for prospect theory’s value
function could be taken from observations about a
user’s decision (e.g. the price of a trade) and from
information about the interactions that preceded their
final choices such as the graphical display and the
underlying data being presented. For the risk value in
prospect theory’s weighting function, we anticipated a
difference between objectively calculating risk and how
risk would perceived when implied in a line chart [7].
In other words, we suggest that to apply prospect
theory to decision-making scenarios in VA it is
necessary to observe both decision values and a the
user’s task in a semantically meaningful way (i.e. buy
or sell), capture the underlying data being presented
and also account for the effect of visualisations on a
person’s perception of value. It is also necessary to make
assumptions about the cognitive and computational
processes that lead up to a person’s final decision,
given that these cannot be observed in the same way
as decision values or actions. This paper contributes a
descriptive model of behaviour which to be empirically
tested in future work, as a step towards a theory of
analytical behaviour. Measuring and predicting risk
perception is outside of the scope.
2. Survey
The following section presents a survey of nine
models from across the VA and HCI literature
relating to analytical reasoning, sense making, and
human-computer interaction processes. The VA models
were identified from a review of more than forty visual
analytics papers specifically referring to analytical
reasoning or sense-making. The HCI models are based
on a review of more than thirty HCI papers referring
to fundamental models and frameworks of interaction
processes. None of the models specifically relate to
decision-making but they each offer a view into the
entities, actions, and processes that facilitate the type of
decision-making scenarios in VA we are interested in.
From an initial analysis of all models, we are
able to identify four common components that are
relevant to decision-making in all the models of the
survey; the entities present in the model (i.e. person,
computer), divisions of labour between entities, their
behaviour (meaning their actions as defined by their
role and agency), plus the elements and processes which
define the flow of data and information both within and
between entities.
The survey summary presented in Table 1 shows
five models from the VA literature and four from
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI). The HCI models
serve to illustrate (and to varying degrees somewhat
describe) the low-level interactions that exist - but
are not shown - in the normative VA models. The
summary table provides the publication reference for
each model and the model title. A model type states
if it is normative (i.e. what users should do), descriptive
(it more closely predicts what people actually do), or
mixed. Field indicates whether the model is from VA
or HCI, entities observes whether human or computer
entities are explicitly presented in the model. A count
of explicit divisions of labour is given, along with a
coding of the type of information flow that is either
unidirectional in the case of the HCI models, iterative
in the case of sense-making, or containing linear or
mixed-initiative elements. Finally, a summary of the
main elements and processes are provided - these are
simply the key titles and annotations that appear within
the models.
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2.1. Observations from the Survey
We find that all of the models from the visual
analytics literature provide a normative view of
reasoning processes; they show what users should
do and not what they actually do. For the
sense-making model, Pirolli and Card [13] set their
model apart from other reports that ’provide normative
or prescriptive views on intelligence analysis’ by basing
the model on an empirical study of analysts’ working
processes. However, their conceptual model represents
’an approximate data flow observed across several
analysts’ [24], offering a more informed - but ultimately
still a normative view - of behaviour relating to the
collection and organization of information, some of
which may precede analytical behaviour.
From the visual analytics models, only two explicitly
show two entities. Both the Human Cognition Model
[25] and the Knowledge Generation Model [17] show
clearly defined human and computer entities but in
different ways. The former presents several patterns
of discourse between the two entities, whereas the
latter groups several different models under human or
computer entities without fully integrating them. All
the HCI models present the same two entities (human
and computer), showing physical features and implied
constraints of the entities as well as the discourse they
are engaged in.
There are no divisions of labour or mediating objects
(e.g. screen, mouse, keyboard) explicitly illustrated in
the majority of the VA models. In contrast there does
exist an explicitly rendered division of labour between
agents in all the HCI models. However, only Dix’s
model [20] puts a physical space between entities that
is mediated by artefacts.
The behaviour observed in the surveyed VA models
includes include searching, evaluating, presenting, data
mining, and the production of knowledge artefacts.
Differences in the behaviour illustrated between models
stems from differences in HCI and VA perspectives, and
also from the subject under observation. Pirolli and
Card’s sense-making diagram [13] is based on a study
of intelligence analysts, while the HCI models describe
low-level interactions that form the basis for high-level
tasks and behaviours shown in VA models.
There are some common elements and processing
concepts across models, while others are unique to
a single model. In all of the HCI models but only
one of the visual analytics models (from Green and
Sacha [16]), the physical structure constrains the flow of
information, rendering it unidirectional. This illustrates
the true way that information, during a human-computer
analytic discourse, moves in one direction; from
visualisations on screen to the human eye and mind,
then from the mind into physical interactions - an input
the computer then responds to by changing what is
displayed on screen.
2.2. Interaction Taxonomies
As part of the survey we also reviewed literature
classifying low-level interactions and high-level tasks,
which relate to the behaviour either implied or illustrated
in most of the models in the survey.
Task analysis in VA has covered a broad range
of topics and challenges, including; task taxonomies
[26, 27, 28], interaction log analysis [29], identifying
information visualisation activities [30], classifying
activity patterns [31], creating a typology of abstract
visualisation tasks [32], and characterising the tasks
undertaken by intelligence analysts [33]. Researchers
have also used ’provenance trail’ vocabularies in
collaborative analysis [34], as an aid in teaching [35],
to provide visualisation recommendations [36], and to
improve the contextual awareness of a VA system [37].
A continuing challenge in task research is activity
recognition; mapping low-level events to high-level
goals. The problem stems from the fact that goals and
tasks are more likely to be domain-specific whereas
lower-level events and actions are domain-agnostic.
When a person is engaged in a reasoning or
sense-making process, their tasks are more exploratory
and therefore not as easily inferred. Comparatively,
actions relating to decision-making are easier to observe
when they relate to simple actions in an interface such as
buying, selling, or bidding. Other non-economic actions
could also be detected, such as changes to physical
behaviour immediately after reviewing health data from
a fitness-tracker application for instance. Our assertion
is that decision-making within the scope of the study of
analytical behaviour can be observed and descriptively
modelled - unlike the goals relating to normative tasks
that need to be generalised from observed actions, such
as sense-making and reasoning.
3. Towards a Theory of Analytical
Behaviour: Observations
The following section presents a set of observations
proposed as the initial principles of analytical behaviour,
developed from our survey of VA and HCI models
in 1. The principles describe the entities, structure
and processes in VA that facilitate decision-making.
Further empirical evidence is required to support that
the proposed principles are all necessary and sufficient
to describe analytical behaviour. Our present intention
is therefore only to propose a set of principles to subject
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to further experimentation and evaluation towards the
goal of creating a theory of analytical behaviour. The
proposed principles are: bilateral discourse, divisions
of labour, mixed-synchronicity information flows, and
bounded behaviour. An overview of each principle is
given below, followed by a visual model to illustrate
most of the principles at work and as a tool for the design
and evaluation of analytical behaviour.
• bilateral discourse defines there to be two
entities engaged in an analytic discourse; one
human user and one computer system. Additional
devices mediate communication between the two.
• divisions of labour outlines the physical space
between human and machine, but also separations
in the work they are ideally suited to - creative
thinking and cognition are the strengths of people,
but computers are far superior when it comes to
memory accuracy and capacity or computations
at speed and scale.
• mixed-synchronicity data flows describe the
fundamental dynamics of how information (and
data) flow between the two entities and across
the division of labour. The majority of
models in the survey present a unidirectional
flow of information; from a computer screen,
across a physical division to a user’s eye, and
brain where cognitive processes form decisions
that are turned into actions as an input via
a mouse or keyboard that goes back to the
computer. The principle of mixed-synchronicity
information flow states that there are two types
of unidirectional information flow; synchronous
(which blocks other information flows) and
asynchronous (which allows other information to
flow through while the original process finishes).
• bounded behaviour highlights that each entity is
limited in its own capacity to process information
and act. The principle draws on the concept
of bounded rationality from economics [38, 39].
Bounded behaviour is inclusive of other biases
[40] and framing effects also [41, 42, 43]
3.1. Bilateral Discourse
In two of the visual analytics models and all of the
HCI models surveyed in Section 2, entities are seen
to explicitly engage in a discourse with one another.
Cook and Thomas refer to analytic discourse as ”the
technology-mediated dialogue between an analyst and
his or her information to produce a judgement about
an issue” [1, p.38]. Adding that it is an ”iterative
and evolutionary process by which a path is built from
definition of the issue to the assembly of evidence
and assumptions to the articulation of judgements”.
Both ’bilateral’ and ’analytic’ discourse underscore
the relationship between the user and the computer is
collaborative and dynamic as a function. However,
analytic discourse infers sense-making whereas bilateral
discourse is intended to describe a more fundamental
structural dynamic in all processes that lead to analytical
behaviour.
The two entities engaged in a discourse are separated
physically by a barrier of communication mediated by
physical input/output devices. Bilateral in this context
is taken to mean a system of two sides - man and
machine as two halves of something that is more than
the sum of its parts. The two entities are bridged by
peripherals like display monitors that act as impartial
translators between entities. There are some instances
where decisions made by more than two entities, but
these situations are outside of the present scope. Our
focus is on a unit of analysis confined to one user and
one computer (interface) and any artefacts that mediate
their interaction.
Specifically, bilateral defines a process that relates
to two sides of something, in this case the discourse
between the user and the computer. The term Bilateral
should not be taken to imply additional constraints on
the role each entity plays, their level of intelligence, or
the agency of either entity at any point in the process.
Both entities are free to change their role to support the
goal of optimising decision-making, the discourse still
remains bilateral. Either entity can act as the initiator
of a task or process - there is no boundary to the level
of autonomy or role that either entity can take. The
computer could either be passive or active with varying
degrees of intelligence [44, 45]. Either entity can initiate
a new flow of information depending on the autonomy
and role of the entity, providing the flexibility to describe
different discourse patterns such as those seen in the
Human Cognition Model [16].
3.2. Divisions of Labour
Conceptually, a division of labour describes the
point of separation between entities. It also determines
the boundary of an entity’s functional capacity within an
economic system. The concept of divisions of labour
in economics can be traced back to Adam Smith’s
commentary on the shared working practises observed
in a pin factory in the late 18th-century [46, 47]. The
topic of labour division has already permeated the
visual analytics literature when it was used to explain
how visual analytics ”integrates scientific disciplines to
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improve the division of labour” (between humans and
computers) [14, p.157].
In financial VA tools, divisions of labour depend on
the type of user - professionals may need more specific
computational assistance and more control and detailed
market analysis while consumers with less knowledge
and less time to spend want simple insights and clear
guidance. Consumer-focused investment mobile apps
try to reduce the complexity of data visualisations
and simplify the decision-making process by providing
more intuitive portfolio projections and uncomplicated
investment options.
Of the surveyed models in Table 1, not all of them
show a single division of labour. The Value Model [14]
is the only model to include two divisions; one between
Data and Visualisation, the other between Visualisation
and the User. This could be interpreted from Cook
and Thomas’ description of analytic discourse being
a ”technology-mediated dialogue between an analyst
and his or her information”. However, while Cooks
and Thomas’ definition and Keim’s value model agree,
their view is at odds with the single division of labour
presented by the HCI and two other visual analytics
models that group data and visualisation within the
computer entity. Comparatively, the Human Cognition
Model (HCM) [25] and the Knowledge Generation
Model (KGM) [17] both explicitly show a single
division of labour.
The role of some recent analytics systems have
introduced the capability to recommend graphs based on
the tasks a user is performing [48, 49, 44]. Other VA
research is evolving the previous limits of a computers
role, and changing the human role, with developments
in mixed-initiative systems [44, 50].
3.3. Bounded Behaviour
The principle of bounded behaviour asserts that
in the process of bilateral discourse, both entities are
subject to the physical, computational, informational,
psychological, and role constraints that apply to either
people or machines. Economics assigns the term
bounded rationality to ”rational choice that takes into
account the cognitive limitations of the decision maker”
[38, p.291]. A central theme in behavioural economics,
bounded rationality highlights the limitations of the
decision-maker in the process of decision-making [51,
52, 38, 39]. The principle of bounded behaviour
introduced in this section borrows extensively from the
economic concept of bounded rationality.
Of all of the visual analytics models surveyed in
Table 1, entities are always subject to constraints that
restrict behaviour. For example, there is a finite amount
of information that can be encoded into a chart before
it either becomes too difficult for the eyes and mind
to process or it becomes too big to show on a screen.
Visual complexity is one of several known challenges
with visual perception [10, 53, 54].
The constraints of bounded behaviour also relate
to well documented biases in economics such as
availability bias, anchoring, confirmation bias and
recency bias [55, 56, 40]. Research in VA has already
begun to identify and compensate for selection bias [57],
but the current effort to combat bias is vastly outweighed
by the number biases known to economic researchers.
Behaviour could also be bound by representation
effects. Recent experimental evidence specifically
measuring the affect of visualisations on analytical
behaviour suggests that changes to a graph’s proportion
and the use of a dual-line chart (compared to two
single line-charts) affects the choices of a significant
number of people [7]. This example goes beyond
the perceptual limitations previously mentioned, which
are only concerned with the perceptual accuracy and
not how it affects decision-making. When considering
a choice under uncertainty, research in economics
suggests that people go through a process of framing
and evaluating values and risk, such that most people
are more sensitive to losses than gains [58, 59, 41].
As an example of bounded behaviour in the
real-world, a user after viewing the historical and current
prices of a listed stock will make a choice to buy or sell
(or do nothing). The user cannot possibly be aware of all
qualitative or quantitative data relating to market trends
- she is bound by physical limitations. Moreover, the
presentation method itself may create a representation
effect that leads the user to inaccurately interpret the
level of risk or return, making one choice potentially
more appealing than another. Also, the user’s reference
point could be influenced by framing effects [59, 60],
leading to changes in how gains and losses are perceived
that alter a person’s final choice. Taken together there
are many ways a user’s behaviour can be bound by the
limitations of perception, psychology and cognition.
3.4. Mixed-Synchronicity Information Flows
The fourth principle of mixed-synchronicity
information flows describes two types of information
”fluidity”; synchronous and asynchronous. Synchronous
information processing blocks other information-flows
until processing has completed; therefore stopping
one or more entities from completing or initiating a
task. Asynchronous information by comparison does
not block the processing or performance of tasks.
To our knowledge, no studies have yet examined the
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’synchronicity’ of human responses in relation to the
accuracy of value judgements or decision-making in the
context of VA. However, there are plenty of everyday
examples of mixed-synchronicity easily observed, such
as reading sheet music while playing an instrument, or
driving a car while talking to passengers.
Regardless of processing capacity, the flow of
information is unidirectional at the lowest level of
interaction. In other words, information can only flow
in one direction between the user and the computer;
from computer screen to the users visual perception
and their mind. Then, utilising peripherals, the user
interacts with the computer which responds and reflects
the change on-screen. The HCI models in the survey
demonstrate this at a low-level not seen in the VA
models. The high-level tasks in sense-making and
reasoning are still made up of a series of the same
lower-level interactions that are unidirectional and either
synchronous or asynchronous.
Depending on who or what is processing information
(or data), the type and rate of occurrences of are likely
to differ. For instance, when a user moves an input
device (e.g. a mouse) the computer is not blocked
from doing other processing. However, a person is not
able to write at all well while simultaneously trying to
also listen to (and process) unrelated audio information.
Both example processes are synchronous - the two tasks
cannot occur at the same time, one blocks the other.
Comparatively but computationally, a high number of
SVG (Scalable Vector Graphics) elements rendered to
a web page can cause the web browser to ”hang” and
therefore temporarily block the user from interacting
until processing is complete. It is possible therefore,
for a person or computer to ’block’ both themselves and
one another from processing or initiating an information
flow.
4. Analytical Behaviour Model
In this section we present a model of analytical
behaviour based on the principles introduced in the
previous section. The Analytical Behaviour (AB)
Model features two entities with a physical divide
between them. Two peripheral devices mediate
the communication divide between entities (e.g.
input/output devices Y and X in Figure 1. These are
assumed to be a display monitor (X) and a standard
mouse and keyboard (Y), but could be replaced with
other hardware such as touch screen on a mobile device,
a voice interface or specialist VR/AR equipment. In
the case of a mobile device, the touch screen interface,
computer, and screen are all the same physical device.
The model in Figure 1 is still valid, the flexibility
Figure 1. The Analytical Behaviour Model complies
with the four principles of Analytical Behaviour and
also integrates dual-systems theory while drawing
structural influence from HCI models.
remains also for the two peripherals to be combined
into one element to represent a shared screen and
interface. Regardless, the flow of information would still
be unidirectional and the principles still valid.
The flow of information is unidirectional except
for the data store in the AB Model. However, data
process and the data store could just as well have been
a combined component. Either way, unidirectional data
flow is not a principle itself but an observation of the
flow driven by the input/output devices. Information
flows from the monitor to the user, and from the
user’s mouse or keyboard to the computer - it cannot
flow in reverse. The principle of mixed-synchronicity
does apply to the data store and data processing flow,
the realities of which are entirely dependant on the
architecture of an application. Therefore, the data store
and flow shown in the AB Model are one of several
possible abstractions.
The dual-systems theory of cognition is a concept
from economics [61] that was in the work on prospect
theory [39]. Dual-process theory defines two modes of
cognition; intuition and reasoning. The theory has been
used not just in economics but in cognitive and social
psychology, so widely has it been applied that providing
a coherent view of the theory is challenging [62]. The
shared view however, is that there are two systems of
thinking labelled as System 1 and System 2 that align to
intuition and reasoning respectively.
Using dual-systems theory in the AB model is a
logical step towards a theory of analytical behaviour and
the application of prospect theory to decision-making in
VA. Intuition and reasoning in dual-systems theory are
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two ways people solve problems; Kahneman suggests
that intuition most resembles perception in that they
are both subject to reference dependence and both
”come to mind spontaneously” [39]. Reasoning is a
slower, more conscious process by comparison. In
the VA models from our earlier survey, ”knowledge”
and ”insight” are often used as a way to generalise
about cognitive processes. Similarly, HCI models often
generalise cognitive processes as ’cognition’, which is
much broader than the VA models. Dual-systems theory
offers a more complete view of cognition that aligns to
prospect theory while not entirely displacing existing
notions of cognition from VA or HCI.
5. The Analytical Behaviour Model as a
Web Framework
To explore the practical use of the AB model, a small
JavaScript library was created to observe, describe, and
potentially even predict analytical behaviour in a web
browser. The library is based entirely on the AB Model
and design to observe and store information about the
SVG visualisations used on screen, their underlying
data, and the user’s action (to buy or sell stocks in
a single page web-app). A simulation was created
based on a previous experiment into representation
effects involving three-hundred participants [7] where
participants made a series of choices between different
pairs of stock investment opportunities presented on the
screen as two line graphs. The premise being that the
user is selecting a stock to invest, under uncertainty,
given the limited information about each stock’s price
over the last thirty days and their perceived risk profiles.
The completed web framework provides some
validation of the AB Model as a descriptive model
of behaviour by capturing SVG information, the
underlying data being visualised on-screen, as well
observing the user’s button clicks. The cognitive
systems of a user is not directly observable, which is
where prospect theory applies as model of choice under
uncertainty.
However, when we tried to apply the value and
weighting functions of prospect theory to analytical
behaviour using the framework, a unmeasured
perceptual issue became evident. Even though we
can account for some representation effects, the risk of a
stock - when visualised in a line chart - is implied by the
user from the shape of the line. In the original prospect
theory experiments by Kahneman and Tversky, these
were explicit written probabilities. Therefore, to apply
prospect theory using the AB framework the user’s
perception of risk must be accounted for and converted
into a value for use in the prospect theory formula.
We know from a previous experiment [7] that the
height-to-width ratio of a graph effects the decisions
of users. Representation effects explain the variance
between users’ choices when they view different styles
of the same data, but they do explain the precise risk
value that the user actually perceives.
5.1. Summary
This paper presented a model and characterisation
of analytical behaviour, defined as decision-making
facilitated by visual analytics techniques and
technologies [7]. In an analysis of VA models in
the survey we focused on four elements; the entities
present in the model (i.e. human analyst or computer),
divisions of labour, behaviour (roles, agency), and the
elements and processes that define the flow of data in
the models.
The result of the survey analysis is a set of
observations put forward as principles; bilateral
discourse, divisions of labour, bounded behaviour, and
mixed-synchronicity data flows. These principles would
benefit from additional supporting evidence in future, in
the form of empirical evidence.
From these principles, a model of analytical
behaviour is developed. Whether explicitly shown in
a model or not - two entities are always present in the
analytic discourse, even if they are implied as is the
case with the normative VA models of reasoning and
sense-making. A physical divide exists between the
user and the computer which is represented explicitly in
all the HCI models but only in two of the VA models.
The majority of the models surveyed also indicate a
unidirectional flow of information, which is not itself a
core principle.
The visual analytics models we surveyed tend to
describe the user’s behaviour normatively, in terms
of tasks, goals, or generalised actions. HCI models,
by contrast, show low-level interactions that more
closely describe the fundamental mechanics underlying
human-computer discourse implied in all VA processes -
reasoning, sense-making, and also analytical behaviour.
We have not been able to illustrate all four principles
in the model. Mixed-synchronicity information flows
can only be shown by animating the model or with
alternative layouts. The four principles presented in
this chapter align closely to the low-level structure seen
in HCI models which, like the AB Model presented in
Figure 1, illustrate a unidirectional flow of information
and a single division of labour between two entities.
We have discussed mixed-synchronicity information
flows in detail and how the behaviour of human
and (intelligent) machines can experience different
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types bounded behaviour due to their unique physical,
computational or psychological limitations. We have
aligned the concept of behavioural constraints (in the
principle of bounded behaviour) to the economic theory
of ’bounded rationality’, providing examples to support
our assertions of this concept in the context of analytical
behaviour.
To complete our descriptive model of analytical
behaviour with the application of prospect theory, future
work must focus on understanding users’ perception of
risk in line charts. One of the required parameters in
the value and weighting functions of prospect theory are
explicit risk values [12]. However, risk is only implied
in line charts. Before prospect theory can be applied it is
necessary to measure and predict the perception of risk
from a line chart, which to our knowledge has not been
addressed in either the economic or VA literature.
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